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Abstract: Due to the nature of available land as one of the main attractions for investment, land
lease marketing in Sub-Saharan Africa is appearing on policy agenda. This paper describes critical
land-related institutional and governmental frameworks that have shaped the contemporary land
governance and land lease contracts in Ethiopia. It also examines the effectiveness of the land lease
process regarding economic, social, and environmental expectations from agricultural outsourcing.
Both qualitative and quantitative data analyses were used and results showed that the size of the
land cultivated by investors is significantly lower than the agreed-upon size in the contract. Besides,
the supply of land to large-scale commercial investors in Ethiopia is made without adequate land
use planning, land valuation, and risk analysis. Furthermore, limitations in monitoring systems
have contributed to meager socio-economic gains and led to deforestation. Accordingly, the study
concludes that supplying vast tracts of farmland to large-scale agricultural investors requires
integrated land use planning, land valuation and governance, monitoring systems, and a capacity to
implement the various social and environmental laws in coordination with other sectors. Improving
rural infrastructure, particularly road, is also indispensable to enhance the level of performance of
commercial farms. Last but most importantly, the customary land holding rights of residents should
be respected and institutionally recognized.
Keywords: land grabbing; sustainable agriculture; food security; sustainable development; land lease
1. Introduction
1.1. Transnational Land Acquisition
Among the academia, practitioners, policy makers, and institutions involved in the transnational
land acquisition, or the “land grabbing” and land deals, there is lots of debate with full of discontents,
emotions, and justifications. Most of the recent literature highlight the term “land grabbing” as a
contemporary phenomenon caused by the combined effects of the global stock market crash and the
food and energy crisis of 2008/2009 [1–4]. However, the term was also mentioned in earlier works
by Karl Marx for the first time in the context of the enclosures of England: “The laborers are first driven
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from the land, and then come the sheep. Land grabbing on a great scale, such as was perpetrated in England, is
the first step in creating a field for the establishment of agriculture on a great scale” [5]. Following the global
financial crisis as well as the increasing demand for food and bio-fuel and the effects of climate change,
a new wave of land transactions in many developing countries have been stemmed [6,7].
In order to produce and export food and bio-fuel, government officials of “land abundant”
agrarian countries facilitated foreign companies and governments to move in a move that resulted
in the dispossession, expulsion, and adverse incorporation of local communities [8]. For example,
South Korean Daewoo Logistics planned to invest in 1.3 million hectares of land to produce maize
in Madagascar, but after a large debate in the country the transitional government cancelled its
license [9]. Furthermore, Hamelinck (2013) [10] has shown that many other land deals which had
aspired to produce bio-fuel underwent serious public pressure and resulted in the cancellation of
long-term land use agreements. Yet studies from Mozambique and Tanzania reported significant
interest in biofuel projects [11]. In Ghana, Schoneveld et al. (2010) [12] focus on a biofuel project in
which 800 hectares of land were taken, causing 70 households in three different villages to lose their
farmlands. The governments of developing countries which host such investments on the other hand,
would consider transnational land acquisition as part of their development strategy; an opportunity
to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) to their agricultural sectors and would supply land to
transnational investor companies and to mainly rich governments [13–17]. In addition to governments
maintaining transnational land deals, international development institutions facilitate the acquisition
of land by big corporations (both foreign and domestic), typically in the form of leases or concessions
rather than outright land purchases for development [2]. Furthermore, governments in countries that
have a high potential for agricultural production and a good competitive advantage are encouraging
renewed commercial investment from domestic and foreign investors. Several governments wish to
allot many of the “idle” lands within their countries and in order that agribusiness implementers may
acquire them. For instance, in July, 2009 the government of Ethiopia allocated 1.6 million hectares
of land, extendable to 2.7 million, for investment in commercial farmlands [18]. All in all, due to
increasing population and urbanization rates and changing diets, the global demand for food is
increasing, along with prices of food, over a longer period. The limitations in the global food supply
and the rising demands for energy and agricultural products make agriculture an interesting option
for investment [19–21].
Unfortunately, quantitative assessments of the geography, scale, and trends in land grabbing are
no longer available yet overall commercial interest in farmland is expected to continue to increase
and to become a long-term trend. Figure 1 shows the global trend of land acquisition concentrate in
key countries in Africa, Southeast Asia (Cambodia, Laos, the Philippines, Indonesia) and parts of
Eastern Europe (e.g., Ukraine). As shown in the figure, 83 million ha of land were acquired globally
out of which 56 million ha were acquired in Africa. However, there is a large discrepancy in the
figures between the amounts of land acquired. According to the Land Matrix data (accessed on
30/01/2016) [22], there are 42,213,284 ha of concluded transnational deals globally, of which 18,789,391
ha belong to Africa. This demonstrates the point that precise data are not yet available, and for a
number of reasons such data can over- or underestimate the true extent of the land acquired. It has
also been found that two-thirds of the cropland that interest foreign investors are located in Africa,
mainly in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)—e.g., South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania, Mozambique, Ethiopia,
Madagascar, The Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, and Zambia [23,24].
While Ethiopia is one of the leading agrarian economies in attracting foreign direct investment,
according to Rulli and D’Odorico (2014) [25], 10.4 million people (11% of the total population of the
country) could have been fed by the crops grown in the acquired land. The country is endowed
with abundant agricultural resource bases and like that of other developing countries’ governments,
the hope of the government of Ethiopia is that investors will bring capital, know-how, technology,
and market-access to their economies. Investors could therefore act as a catalyst for economic
transformation in rural areas where the Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP) of the country is key.
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This, in turn, is expected to generate employment, increase public revenue, improve local people’s
access to infrastructure and upgrade the overall standard of living in local communities. However, the
important question has often remained: “Does this trickle-down effect actually take place and who
really benefits from these transnational land acquisitions?” The country’s institution which promotes
private investment, the Ethiopian Investment Agency (EIA) announced that more than 11.50 million
hectares of land has the potential for farming and agricultural investment [16,26]. Yet of the stated
amount of land, so far, close to 2.5 million hectares have been given to investors who came from
more than 32 different countries and invested in the different regions of the nation between 2007 and
2013.The focus of this paper is the lack of comprehensive evidence regarding the national, regional,
and grass root level issues and effects of transnational land acquisition in Ethiopia with a particular
emphasis to the Benishangul-Gumuz region.
Figure 1. Land acquisitions by continent (Cumulative size of deals, million hectares). Adopted from
Schaffnit-Chatterjee (2012) [23].
1.2. Conceptual Framework
As part of the policy agenda on the SSA, land marketing has come into question. Many of the SSA
countries have gone through consecutive institutional reforms concerning land use; most of which were
made with the support of the World Bank and developed countries [27]. While national land use policies
and strategies vary across countries, common land-related problems, conservation strategies, and
expertise solutions are becoming apparent and provide timely lessons for Ethiopia. Land management
systems are increasingly checked against information-based land use models that contribute to efficient
and effective land use management. Globalization and technological development further enhance
the establishment of multifunctional information systems by incorporating diverse land features,
uses, rights, regulations, and other pertinent data [28]. To this end, contemporary land management
systems should consider the diverse interests and competitive purposes of land before it is marketed
to commercial investment on a long-term basis [29]. A holistic approach to land management most
importantly requires information, recognition of the human, social and governance elements, as well
as adaptation of improved land use practices elsewhere. This approach plays a central role in the
enhancement of informed land marketing chains.
As there are a number of tools which help to conduct sustainable impact assessments of
development projects [30–32], we adapt the Integrated Land Use Management and Responsible
Agricultural Investment framework because, according to Enemark et al. (2005) [28] and FAO et al.
(2010) [33], institutional arrangements, land information systems, and land use management more
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appropriately show the informative level of land markets. Furthermore, it is important to integrate
federal and regional interests including multiple land use sectors and dimensions of sustainability and
to do so on all scales [33]. The interplay between institutional arrangements and land information
systems determines the quality of land use management which again determines the effectiveness and
efficiency of land markets [28,33] (Figure 2).
Figure 2. Integrated Land Use Management (ILUM). Adapted from Enemark et al. (2014) [29].
In an integrated land use management system, the interests of different land uses are balanced
against the broader developmental objectives of a country or region. These interests serve as a base
for the plans of use and for control through institutional mechanisms and incentives. As described
by Reidsma et al. (2011) [34] and Enemark et al. (2014) [29], effective planning and control of land use
requires up-to-date data so as to understand the spatial, temporal, and anthropogenic consequences of
land use policies and decisions. To this end, in addition to integrating sectoral and spatial components,
the process of land use planning and implementation should be participatory. Furthermore, as for
other key issues, allotting land for agricultural investment should include and be designed to meet not
only the interests of the investors but also the needs of the various stakeholders [35], particularly local
communities and those whose livelihoods are attached to the land and environmental sustainability.
With the support of international development partners and civil society organizations the governments
of such countries like Ethiopia need to protect their local communities and natural resources while
attracting foreign investments in order to guarantee their economic growth. Apart from the host
nations and intergovernmental bodies, investors should also commit and take complete responsibility
in the present situation. Accordingly, the impacts of development projects can only be sustained
with an integrated plan where institutional arrangements, land information systems, and land use
management are assured. A responsible agricultural investment is an inclusive situation where the
process of investment respects resource use rights of local communities, ensures local food security, is
transparent, and encourages consultation and participation, investment viability, and environmental
sustainability [33].
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1.3. Objectives
According to “databases” that were directly obtained from the Ministry of Agriculture in Ethiopia
in 2013 [36], 2.11 million ha of the total 11.5 million ha potential land was already given to investors, out
of which 600,254 ha is the share of the Western Ethiopian lowland state called the Benishangul-Gumuz
region [26]. Focusing on this region, the following key research questions are considered in this
study: (i) What are the key institutional frameworks which shaped the contemporary land governance
in Ethiopia? (ii) How effective would the integration and harmonization of large scale commercial
farming with other local development projects be? and (iii) How effective is the land lease process
from the context of integrated land management, and economic, social, and environmental payoffs of
agricultural investment?
2. Methodology and Materials
2.1. Description of Study Area
This paper relies on the data set from the Benishangul-Gumuz region of Ethiopia which is located
at 09.17˝–12.06˝ N latitudes, and 34.10˝–37.04˝ E longitudes along the Western Ethio-Sudan border
(Figure 3), with a total area of about 50,699 km2. According to the Regional Bureau of Agriculture, the
overall area of arable land in the region is about 911,877 ha, of which less than half has been cultivated.
It was noted that 189,534 hectares of land in the region is potentially irrigable [37]. The region is located
in an area where the Grand Renaissance Dam of Ethiopia is under construction over the Abay River (or
Blue Nile) which includes the Beles, Dabus, Anger, Dhidhsa, and Dindir Rivers, which are tributaries
of the Abay River.
Figure 3. Map of the study area (the Benishangul-Gumuz region).
Agro-ecologically, the study area can be classified into three major climatic zones: (a) Lowland
or kola (75% of the region) with an altitude below 1500 m; (b) Midland (woynadega) zone which
constitutes about 24% of the region and has an altitude of 1500–2500 m; and (c) Dega agro-ecologic
zone which accounts for only 1% of the area of the region and lies at an altitude of 2500 m [38].
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2.2. Data Collection and Analysis
In order to analyze the process of commercial farmland acquisition and its effects, multilevel
exploration of qualitative and quantitative data is required. Accordingly, this study collected data at
federal, regional, district, and village or farm levels (Table 1). Rigorous archival review, review of land
lease contracts and accompanied documents, extraction of relevant data from accessed databases, and
interviews were also conducted. Participatory field observation and key informant interviews were
also held at federal, regional, and local levels, though as this information is considered highly sensitive
in Ethiopia, it will not be disclosed. Not to mention that in order to make this survey, we reassured the
respondents that their information would remain confidential.
Table 1. Data sources and methods of data collection.
Level Data Source 1 Focus Method Used
Federal GOE, MOA, EIA(Addis Ababa)
Land laws, regulations,
land/investment data
Document review, contract
review, extraction of relevant
data from accessed databases,
and interviews
Regional
GBGR, investment
bureau, BoARD
(Asosa)
Regional land laws,
regulations, and land
lease system
Document review, key
informant interviews, surveys
District
BoARD, and Natural
Resource Protection
Case Team (Dangure
and Guba)
Practices of delivering land
to investors, resettling
communities
Key informant interviews,
data extraction from
regional databases
Village/farm
Community leaders,
investors, and
employees
Effects on local communities,
environment, concerns from
community, investors, and
employees
Key informant interviews,
data extraction from
regional databases,
participatory observation
1 GOE = Federal Government of Ethiopia; EIA = Ethiopian Investment Agency; GBGR = Government of
the Benishangul-Gumuz region; MOA = Ministry of Agriculture; BoARD = Bureau of Agriculture and
Rural Development.
A total of 26 interviews were made (four in federal-level institutions, six in regional bureaus, seven
at district, and nine at village levels) in the period from October 2013 to January 2014. Additionally,
22 owners and/or managers of commercial farms in the study site were interviewed. A survey of 89
commercial farms was made in the period May 2013–January 2014. Using a structured questionnaire,
the data were collected to assess the performance evaluation of commercial farmers on the ground.
The questionnaire was approved through face validity and the reliability was confirmed by estimating
Cronbach’s alpha (α = 0.78).
Descriptive statistics and relevant statistical tests such as the paired sample t-test were made
to complement the qualitative data analysis and explain the economic, social, and environmental
implications of the ongoing commercial land acquisition in the study area. STATA (version 11) software
was used to conduct statistical computations and a paired sample t-test (with a significant level of
α = 0.05) was run to compare the amount of land taken in lease form and the amount of land developed.
Furthermore, with a significance level of α = 0.05, the paired t-test was made for the size of land
leased by an investor versus the size of land cultivated, and regression analysis on the amount of
land developed and employment generated so as to see whether significant amounts of land were
developed and the expected level of employment opportunities was achieved.
Sustainability 2016, 8, 213 7 of 27
3. Results and Discussion
3.1. Governance
3.1.1. Land in Ethiopia: The Institutional and Governance Framework
According to the Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia [39], the right of
land ownership and other natural resources of the country exclusively belong to the State and the
peoples of Ethiopia. This implies that, all subsidiary laws and regulations of the country which could
be issued either by the federal or regional state bodies recognize usufructuary rights to land which can
be in the form of state, communal or group, and private holdings. While the right to use and inherit
land is preserved, private ownership of land is prohibited. As explained by GOE (2005) [40], our study
also corroborates that the private ownership of land is prohibited to ensure equity of land use among
citizens and between generations, especially in the rural areas where livelihood exclusively depends
on land; if not, the country would be threatened by the social predicaments of land accumulation
within a few hands. Therefore, it is up to the federal government to determine the amount and type of
land a citizen may hold in the country. The main justification given for this system is that if land is
privatized, small-holder farmers may sell it when they face financial difficulties (desperation sales) and
ultimately the country’s land would be under the hands of a few rich farmers. According to Galor et al.
(2009) [41], the concentration of land in the hands of a minority and inequality in land ownership
adversely affects institutions that promote human capital, for instance public schooling. A study by
Cárdenas (2012) [42] shows that such instances of concentrated land ownership have already occurred
in some Latin American countries such as Colombia. Similarly, Pestana et al. (2013) [43] in their study
in Brazil showed that inequitable allocation of land contributed to land-related conflicts and unrest in
the country.
Prohibiting private land ownership, on the other hand, may not be an adequate guarantee for
equitable distribution of land among citizens. As argued in some studies [44,45] policies that prohibit
private ownership of land have been criticized because it stifles farmland investments and could
lead to unproductive and excessively small parcels of land size. According to Nyssen (1998) [46], the
land tenure system in Ethiopia has made positive contributions to the unprecedented involvement
of farmers in soil and water conservation because land is “equally” shared among farmers unlike
previous land holding systems. Some studies [8] showed that governments play an important role
in of the political economy of a global capitalist system where the contemporary ramifications of
land acquisition are considered as part of “security mercantilism” in international relations. Yet the
continuing debate in Ethiopia is whether or not consolidating all the land under the custody of the
state is considered as suppressing citizens’ rights to privately own land. The federal government,
through the constitution and other laws that followed later, assigned mandates and jurisdiction to the
different federal and regional government organs as summarized chronologically in the Appendix.
3.1.2. Evolution of Land Use–Land Governance Institutional Frameworks in Ethiopia
The current institutional framework of Ethiopia concerning land use governance is the result of a
number of consecutive institutional and regulatory developments. According to the 1955 constitution
of Ethiopia [47], all natural resources of the country (water, forest, land, etc.) became the state’s domain
since 1955. Later, in 1974, “Land to the tiller” was one of the mottos of the socialist-driven revolution
in the country as land ownership was one of the major issues at the time and of the revolution which
overthrew the imperial/feudal system in the country. As a result of the 1974 socialist revolution in
Ethiopia [48], all forms of private ownership of land were abolished without any compensation, and all
lands used for agriculture or grazing purposes throughout the country were declared to be the collective
property of Ethiopians. Due to the functioning supreme law of Ethiopia (i.e., the 1995 constitution of
the country), land and all other natural resources are commonly owned by the Nations, Nationalities,
and Peoples of Ethiopia and are not subject to sale or to other means of exchange. As noted by GOE
Sustainability 2016, 8, 213 8 of 27
(1995) [39,49], regional states are given the power and mandate to administer land and other natural
resources in accordance with federal laws. Peasants and pastoralists have usufructuary right over land
without any charge and without time limit, and have safeguards against expulsion from “their” land
unless it is intended for public purposes and are then subject to compensation.
In addition to the chronology of stated proclamations and regulations, under the tenets of the 2005
Federal Rural Land Administration and Land Use Proclamation (Federal proclamation no. 456/2005),
non-pastoralist regions of Ethiopia have enacted their own regional rural land administration laws,
regulations, and guidelines. The first two regions in this case are Tigray (regional proclamation
no. 97/2006, and land use regulation no. 37/2007), and Amhara (regional proclamation no. 133/2006,
and land use regulation no. 51/2007). As well as the Southern Region’s Rural Land Administration
and Use Proclamation (regional proclamation no. 97/2006) and the Oromia Rural Land Administration
and Use Proclamation (regional proclamation no. 130/2007). As explained by Tigistu (2011) [50],
the Gambela and the Benishangul-Gumuz regions enacted their land proclamation in 2010, with the
Benishangul-Gumuz regional state having a regional Rural investment Land Use Regulation, regulation
no. 29/2009. The remaining regions (Afar, Harari, and Somali), lack legislation for administering their
land for rural and clan-based uses, hence it is currently difficult to enforce laws and formally recognize
peasants’ and pastoralists’ rights in these regions.
3.1.3. Investment Land Supply and the Land Lease Contracts
Investment Land Supply
According to official investment guidelines developed by the Ethiopian Investment Agency, as of
2013, a total of 11,545,902 ha of potential investment land was made available to investors in Ethiopia
(Table 2). In the Benishangul-Gumuz region, the total amount of land delivered to both foreign and
domestic investors has taken the lead with 600,254 hectares, followed by Oromiya and Gambella
regional states with 458,292 and 399,491 ha, respectively (Table 2).
Table 2. Land size of agricultural investment in Ethiopia.
Potential
Investment
Land
Total
Land
Delivered
Regions
Benishangul-Gumuz Oromiya Gambella Other 8 Regions (Total)
Land Size
(ha) 11,545,902 2,110,000 600,254 458,292 399,491 651,963
Source: MoA (2013) [36].
Given the discrepancy in stated figures among different authors, the figure seems exaggerated
and, therefore, further assessment is required. For instance, according to Deininger et al. (2011) [51],
since mid 2010, the total amount of land allocated to local and foreign investors is 1.2 million ha with a
regional distribution of 535,000 ha (Gambela), 380,000 ha (Oromia), 191,500 ha (Benishangul-Gumuz),
60,500 ha (SNNP), 20,000 ha (Afar), and 18,000 ha (Amhara). However, according to recent information
from the Ministry of Agriculture [36] (i.e., since October, 2013), in total, there are about 238 foreign
agricultural investment projects from about 32 origins/countries (including the Ethiopian diasporas)
which took a total of 736,228 ha of land in the different regions of Ethiopia. There is a variation in
stated figures among different authors, and such discrepancies of figures are, however, common not
only for Ethiopia but also for other host countries. Furthermore, there is large discrepancy in the
figures between the amount of land stated on an investor’s investment contractual agreement (on the
document) and the actual amount of land delivered on the ground, where the latter is significantly
lower than the former. According to our survey results, in most cases the amount is lower by up to
50%–60%. Edelman et al. (2013) [52] believe the reasons for such discrepancies are a result of poor
planning in terms of land use and a lack of information about investment land supplies.
The soaring demand for agricultural products and the uncertainty of international food markets
has recently drawn the attention of governments and agribusiness firms to investments in productive
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agricultural land, mostly in the developing world [25]. The estimated potential areas of agricultural
investment for the cultivation of agricultural products in all regional states of the country are presented
in the Figure 4. The country also has a huge potential for large-scale plantations to produce pulse,
cotton and oil crops.
Figure 4. Potential areas of agricultural investment in Ethiopia, adapted from EIA (environmental
impact assessment) (2013) [16].
Land Lease Contracts
According to the revised land use directive which was developed in 2009 and became effective
in 2011/2012, there was no maximum limit set on the amount of land that an investor could take.
The maximum threshold of land that can be given to an investor is set based on the type of land
development (Table 3), the capacity of the project (its capital and skilled man power), level of
employment creation, and fertility level of the land. While there is no limit set on the amount of
land that an investor can take, investors cannot buy as much land as they want due to a maximum
limit on the type of investment land.
In Ethiopia, as opposed to other countries (e.g., Canada etc., [4,15,53–55]), investors cannot lease
as much land as they want. There is a limit both in terms of land size and land lease period, while land
is leased to investors depending on the area of investment and other terms (Tables 3 and 4). As stated
by EIA (2012) [26], the Ministry of Agriculture has given the responsibility of providing technical
support to private investors in agriculture. According to the MoA (2009) [56] land of size 5000 ha and
above and which are found in a single place will be administered by the Ministry of Agriculture, and
lands below 5000 ha found in different places (or pockets lands) will be administered by an appropriate
regional office.
Table 3. Maximum threshold of land size for an investment project in Ethiopia [56].
Area of Investment Threshold (Land in ha) Area of Investment Threshold (Land in ha)
Bio-fuel 50,000 Food crop 20,000
Palm oil 50,000 Oil crop 20,000
Rubber tree 10,000 Vegetable production 150
Cotton 20,000 Fruit and enset production 5000
Forestry 20,000 Livestock farming 30
Sugar cane 20,000 Animal fattening 5
Coffee plantation 5000 Seed reproduction 5000
Tea plantation 5000 Wild animal production 50
Forage production 5000 Tobacco production 5000
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The Benishangul-Gumuz regional government has also set a maximum threshold of land for
different areas of investment (Table 3). The regional government’s proposition of delivering 200–500 ha
of land to a single investor is ambitious, vague, and imprudent in light of some of the regulatory points
that are contrary to what is stated by the Federal Government. It did not indicate a land lease period
limit for an investment land of 200 ha and less, while the threshold by the regional government is
made in terms of land size and years. However, specifically in reference to the horticultural sector, the
land lease period further varies according to the type of land (i.e., either cultivated or non-cultivated).
Moreover, the regional government limited the land lease holding period of 25–35 years (Table 4).
Table 4. Type of investment land and land lease duration.
Type of Investment Land Lease Period/Duration (Years)
201–500 ha Above 500 ha
Cultivated land
Rain fed 20–25 30–35
Irrigation 20–30 30–35
Non-cultivated land
Rain fed 25–30 35–40
Irrigation 20–25 30–35
Dairy production 20 25
Fast-growing perennial production 20 35
Horticulture 30 35
Livestock rearing and/or fattening 20 25
Source: Regional land use regulation [57].
Although the regional government set 20–35 years as the maximum lease periods for investment
lands in the region, there are companies in the same region with contracts of 50 years. These companies
hold land on a large-scale basis and the contractual agreement was made not between the regional
government and the company but with the Federal government and the company. This is because
the regions have “delegated their authority upwards” to the Federal Government (i.e., Ministry of
Agriculture), for leasing adjoining farm land areas of above 5000 ha so as to expedite the development
of large farm lands for export and industrial crops.
3.1.4. Bilateral Land Lease Contracts: Lessee-Lessor Rights and Obligations
Commercial land lease agreements in Ethiopia are generally bilateral. Meaning, land lease
agreements are made between the investor termed in contracts as “lessee” and the responsible
government body, mainly the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) called the “lessor”. The following
describes the rights and obligations of each party.
Lessee
The lessee is vested with rights to develop land for the cultivation of crops and plantations as
agreed upon with the lessor. The lessee can build relevant infrastructure and facilities which are
helpful to enable its investment operations upon consultation and permit from concerned bodies.
Moreover, the lessee can administer or develop the leased land by itself or through a legally delegated
agency or person. The lessee has full rights to use mechanization or other methods that they consider
as proper for developing the land. As explained by Stebek (2011) [13], the right to get additional land
is maintained by the lessee based on performance on the ground. Upon presentation of convincing
reasons or for better options, by providing at least six months’ time to the lessor, the lessee can cancel
the contract.
The lessee is obliged to take care of and conserve the leased land and its natural resources with
specific obligations to: (i) conserve trees which have not been cleared for land preparation, (ii) apply
appropriate farming methods to avoid soil erosion, (iii) adhere to all laws and proclamations related
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to the conservation of natural resources, and (iv) conduct environmental impact assessment (EIA)
followed by submission of the EIA report within three months (the EIA obligation was added to
the contractual agreements recently and used for those land lease agreements made since 2010/2011
following the environmental damages incurred by most of the land lease agreements made between
2007/2008–2009/2010), (v) submit an action plan in advance about the use of leased land together with
the contract agreement document to the Ministry of Agriculture at the time of agreement (although
what is practically found is the contract agreement and no submitted action plan!), (vi) pay the agreed
down-payments, and (vii) start operation on the land within six months from the date of the execution
of the land lease agreement. The lessee is expected to develop at least one-third of the land within a
one-year period, and develop all the land within three years from the date of the execution of the land
lease agreement. For some companies this obligation is adjusted to “develop at least 10% of the leased
plot of land within the first year period from the date of the execution of the land lease agreement, and
should develop the whole leased land within a five-year period”. Yet, no justifiable reason is found for
having two different statements in this part.
Upon terminating the land lease contract or revocation of investment licenses, the lessee should
clean the land from all his assets and hand it over to the lessor within one year and provide investment
activity reports and correct data upon request from the Ministry of Agriculture. Furthermore, the lessee
should pay the land lease rent every year at the rate stated in the agreements. The lessee should not
make any unauthorized use of leased land without written consent from the lessor. Until three-fourths
of the land is developed, the lessee cannot transfer the land or properties developed on the land to any
other individual or company. In addition, an organization or company which leased the land in its
name cannot reallocate the land to its individual members or shareholders, and to do so results in an
automatic revocation of a contract. Upon developing three-fourths of the land, the lessee can transfer
the land or properties developed on the land to any other individual or company only with a permit
from the lessor.
Lessor
The lessor holds exclusive rights to monitor the activities of the lessee in accordance with the
mutually-agreed contract without hindering any of the activities and operations of the lessee. The
lessor also has the right to amend the land rent rate (decrease or increase) in consultation with the
lessee. Finally, after 2010/2011, a new statement was added under the lessor’s right: “With a convincing
reason and for using the land for a better function ( . . . ) the lessor can revoke the land use contract” (Article 5:5
of the contractual template [58]). This implies that, according to key informant officers in the Ministry
of Agriculture, the lessor can revoke the leased land at any time and has created a sense of insecurity
among potential investors and preclusion among investors which had already leased land.
The following are the obligations of the lessor: (i) to supply investment land which is free of
any constraint on the ground to the lessee within ten days from the time of contractual agreement;
however, this does not happen in practice as many of the investors received the land between six
and 15 months after conclusion of the contract and faced many local impediments (for instance land
assumed as free by the government was already in use by local people), overlapping problems with
other investors, and unsuitable land for agricultural practices; (ii) to provide investment privileges and
incentives in accordance with available directives promulgated by the government; (iii) to ensure the
lessee that there are no impediments (legal or other) in relation to land preparation; (iv) to secure access
to the lessee for soil testing facilities or map databases of regional or federal government research
centers; (v) to guarantee peace and security (in collaboration with other governmental bodies) around
the investment areas free of cost from the side of the investee; and (vi) if the investee fails to start
developing land within the agreed time or fails to develop land in accordance with agreements entered
or causes any damage to local natural resources or fails to pay lease fees, the lessor may be obliged to
extend the time for such compliance or obliged to terminate the contract.
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Generally, the land lease contractual agreement focuses on maintaining the interests of the two
parties: the lessee (the commercial companies which acquire land) and the lessor (the governmental
body—either the Ministry of Agriculture or the corresponding delegated body in the regions, i.e., the
regional Bureau of Agriculture and Rural Development). There is no single statement in any of
the contractual documents or templates which requests the participation of any other stakeholders
(e.g., local communities) when signing the land lease contracts. In addition to the rights and obligations
of the parties in the contract, the economic, social, and environmental significance of land lease
agreements should be explored, for instance: How feasible are the contracts economically? What
are the land lease prices across the districts of the Benishangul-Gumuz region? What is the status of
large-scale agricultural investment projects in the region and what are the factors which determine
the progress at farm level in terms of the amount of cultivated land? Additionally, the social and
environmental aspects of the contracts should be explored so as to have a better understanding of
the contracts and their practical implementation on the ground. The following section deals with
the economic, social, and environmental perspectives of large-scale agricultural investment in the
study sites.
3.2. Economic Payoff
3.2.1. Farm Land Lease Price
The expectation that countries have when using land to market to and attract foreign direct
investment is clear; they wish to attract foreign capital, economically use “free” land and improve
the internal state revenue through business (or income) tax. Yet, there is no objective land valuation
in Ethiopia both at the federal and regional levels, although there are a number of methods and
techniques that could be used to measure the benefits of farmland, such as hedonic pricing and
contingent valuation [59–62].Given that, the price quoted for different types of land is not based on
its true values and amenities. The federal government proposes the price of land simply on the basis
of distance from the capital city to the location of the leased land. To put it in a nutshell, the stated
price of land does not reflect the real value of land and the prices are very low compared to local
land rental prices. The country is not benefitting from the actual benefits of land because the value
of land is not properly determined, which results in extremely low land lease prices for large-scale
commercial farmlands compared to the local informal land market values. Furthermore, there is no
formal economic benefit-sharing mechanism with local people.
It is also hoped that investors would construct infrastructures and transfer technology so as to
benefit their host country, yet none of these are formal requirements expected from investors. According
to the interviews made with the lessees, the lower land lease prices are considered as a compensation
for the state’s low infrastructure, bureaucratic land acquisition process, and challenging business
operating environment. Although the government of Ethiopia has a number of consecutive reforms to
create a smooth investment and business operating environment, according to a recent World Bank
report: “Globally, Ethiopia stands at 166 in the ranking of 189 economies on the ease of starting a
business” [63]. Nevertheless, this ranking is a point of debate as the number of business enterprises
formed in the country within a few years has increased by six fold in the period 2002–2012. As noted
by GOE (2012) [64] and EIA (2013) [16] there are also a number of investment incentive packages,
improved infrastructure, and attractive investment environments now offered to investors. However,
the economic benefits of Ethiopian farmlands can be boosted further by pursuing the improvement
of the business operating environment together with proper land use valuation and integrated land
use planning. Considering the land lease pricing system, since 2008 the Benishangul-Gumuz regional
government developed and enforced its own land lease rent prices for each district (Table 5).
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Table 5. Farm land lease price across districts of the region.
Land Lease Price ha/Year Districts
Birr 50 (Euro 3.14 *)
Sirba Abay
Kumruk
Birr 60 (Euro 3.77)
Agalo
Komashi
Menge
Odabildglo
Sherkole
Wenbera
Yaso
Birr 70 (Euro 4.40)
Asosa
Homosha
Bambasi
Belewjiganfoy
Bulen
Dibate
Dangure
Guba
Maokomo
Mandura
Pawe
* 1 Euro = 15.90 Birr (Ethiopian/local currency), 2009; the current exchange rate is about 1 Euro equal to 15.90
Birr. Source: Regional land use regulation [57].
3.2.2. The Status of Large-Scale Land Deals
While the nature of land (cultivated and non-cultivated) is considered as a determinant for setting
land lease periods, it is not considered for determining land lease prices. Due to various reasons, the
average amount of land cultivated or developed by investors is significantly lower than the average
amount of land leased to investors. The main reasons for this difference are the lack of adequate
information about the nature and suitability of land upon which investors agreed to develop, and the
challenges of farmland overlapping and farm border disputes. Furthermore, there are challenging
processes related to the import of agricultural inputs, discrepancies in the capacity of many investors in
terms of the capital they promised to invest in and what they actually invested in and fear of contract
cancellation by the government (Figure 5 and Table 6).
A paired sample t-test was applied to compare the amount of land taken in lease form and
the amount of land developed (i.e., either started operation, as operation is measured in terms of
“developed” land size, or fully entered into production of crops). According to the regional investment
bureau, a “developed land” is a leased land which is under commercial farmers or “investors” and
land preparation has started at the very least. Accordingly, the average land size developed (or
cultivated) by investors (158.32 ha) is significantly (α ď 0.05) lower than that of the average land size
on which investors agreed to develop (461.45 ha). There is a higher variation among the amount of
land delivered to investors (with standard deviation of 774.73) as compared to the variation among
the amount of land developed so far (with standard deviation of 232.60 and α ď 0.05) (Table 7). As
a result, the average land size developed by investors is significantly lower than that of the average
land size on which investors agreed for development. This implies that investors lack the capacity to
cultivate the land that they took or they are discouraged to cultivate as agreed upon in the contract
due to limited infrastructure where the farmlands are located. This shows that in reality the investors
are sometimes not very realistic in the estimate of their capabilities either.
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Figure 5. The status of large-scale agricultural investment projects in the Benishangul-Gumuz region. Source: Ministry of Agriculture (Addis Ababa) and
Benishangul-Gumuz Regional Investment Bureau (Asosa) and own survey.
Table 6. Description of the agricultural investments in Ethiopia and Benishangul-Gumuz.
In Ethiopia In Benishangul-Gumuz
Investment Land Size
(ha) Areas of Major Crops (ha)
Land Size Delivered for A Single
Investor (ha)
Maximum of Land
Lease Duration
(Year)
Employment (2013/2014)
Potential
Land
Land
delivered Pulse Cotton Oil crops
Max: Bio-fuel/
Palm oil
Min: Animal
fattening Cultivated land
Non-cultivated
land Permanent Temporary
11,545,902 2,110,000 3274,469 3,000,810 1,601,323 50,000 5 30–35 35–40 848 3246
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Table 7. Comparison of land size between land leased and cultivated land (t-Test).
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Error Std. Deviation
Size of land leased 86 461.4535 83.5418 774.7348
Size of cultivated land 86 158.318 25.08216 232.6024
Difference 86 303.1355 63.54804 589.3203
Mean (diff) = mean (Size of land leased ´ Size of cultivated land), t = 4.770
Ho: mean (diff) = 0 degrees of freedom = 85
Ha: mean (diff) < 0, Ha: mean (diff)! = 0, Ha: mean (diff) > 0
Pr (T < t) = 1.0000, Pr (|T| > |t|) = 0.0000, Pr (T > t) = 0.0000
3.2.3. The Destination of Products
A study by Rulli and D’Odorico (2014) [25] shows that the food produced in the acquired land is
typically exported to other regions, while the target countries exhibit high levels of malnourishment.
If the food produced were used for domestic consumption, the crops harvested in the acquired land
could ensure food security for the local populations. There is also an on-going debate of a policy issue
between export promotion and the stabilization of local food markets. As stated in the Ethiopian
Investment Guide of 2012, those companies which export half or three-quarters of their production,
are entitled to get comparably more incentives (exemption from income tax [25]) compared to those
investors which supply their production to the domestic market. Even though domestic food market
inflation takes place, this export policy still exists. While encouraging export through explicitly-stated
incentives is good for Ethiopia as a developing country, ensuring the appropriate balance of export
promotion and stabilizing the domestic food supply market is imperative.
3.3. Social Aspect
In order to create social standards for land deals that make a positive contribution to local
development it is necessary to respect the existing land use rights of local people, ensure food
security, transparency, good governance, and community consultation and participation. Article
92(3) of the constitution of Ethiopia states that local people have the right to be consulted fully and
express their view in the planning and execution of policies, projects, and programs that affect them
directly [49]. With respect to the participation of indigenous communities, before land is supplied for
commercial investors, there are community level consultative discussions. There are also a number of
minutes and signed documents in district offices showing the consents of local communities through
their representatives. However, nothing is formally stated on the land lease contractual agreements
regarding the rights and options for local communities. District authorities mainly have the difficult
task of handling claims, conflicts, and grievances voiced by local communities in relation to the
pressure from commercial farming companies. The two leading neighboring districts where many
of the transnational companies obtained land in the form of long-term land lease contracts in the
Benishangul-Gumuz region are the Guba and Dangure districts, where local communities have been
relocated or resettled away from the land they lived on for years.
Key informants and local administrative officials justify this relocation in different ways.
According to the key informants, the eviction is considered as part of the preparation to supply
“their land” to investors. The local administrators call the displacement a “villagization” program
which was made to supply improved social infrastructure such as roads, schools, clinics, water supplies,
electricity, etc., though the on the ground practice has not seen any of those so far. According to the
data extracted from the study areas, a total of 2396 households were dislocated in a three-year period
(Tables 8 and 9). The resettlement creates pressure upon the recipient villagers and the environment.
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Table 8. Relocated and recipient households in the Guba district.
Kebele * ResettledHouseholds
Households in
Recipient Village (s)
Total (% Increase of
Number of Households)
Abela Horus 83 78 161 (106.4%)
Almehal 87 306 393 (28.4%)
Bengo 211 54 265 (390.7%)
Iyssid 104 98 202 (106.12%)
Wedelbahit 46 13 59 (3.54%)
Total 531 549 1080 (96.72%)
Source: Own computation at Guba District office, Mankush. * A “kebele” is the smallest administrative unit in
Ethiopian governance structure and it consists of a minimum of five hundred households or a population of
3500–4000 persons while 1200–3200 persons in Benishangul–Gumuz which is a sparsely populated region.
Table 9. Relocated and recipient households in the Dangure district.
Kebele * ResettledHouseholds
Households in
Recipient Village(s)
Total (% Increase of
Number of Households)
Azaltiktli 97 73 170 (133%)
Aypapo 158 38 196 (415.8%)
Burji 173 190 363 (91.05%)
Gitsi 115 110 225 (104.54%)
Dabuhkokel 99 104 203 (95.19%)
Jimtiya 144 149 293 (96.64%)
Gublak 69 330 399 (20.9%)
Chidanguya 74 23 97 (321.74%)
Dibatie 48 106 154 (45.28%)
Bawla 60 58 118 (103.45$)
Juraysis 54 60 114 (90%)
DekMariam 299 95 394 (314.73%)
Bengez 11 57 68 (19.3%)
Kotay 44 122 166 (36.07%)
Anjakuaya 133 66 199 (201.52%)
Abaydar 287 78 365 (368%)
Total (average % increase) 1865 1659 3524 (112.42%)
Source: Own computation at Dangure District office, Manbuk.
The “performance” of the villagization program enforced by district administration offices and
regional states has affected 13% of the households in Guba and 16% of those in Dangure. If the recipient
communities in the villagization program are taken into account, 27% of households in Guba and
30% of the households in Dangure are affected by the villagization programs. Furthermore, part of
the presumptions behind the commercial supply of farmlands is that they will create employment
opportunities and ensure national food security. According to Ostermeier et al. (2015) [65], employment
creation is a key factor amongst potential community benefits and is particularly interesting for two
reasons: First, the creation of jobs is one of the most common commitments investors make to local
communities when acquiring land. Second, generating employment is a key component for poverty
alleviation. Hence, national governments often welcome and even foster large investments in their
countries. Although wage employment is considered a positive effect of foreign investment, Dessalegn
(2011) [66] argues that the international land deals barely benefit rural people; rather it is considered
as a threat to the local population’s livelihoods. Based on government records, nearly 89,000 citizens
(in the whole Benishangul-Gumuz region) are expected to benefit from land acquisition in the form
of social gains such as employment opportunities for local people. While, until now, throughout
the region, employment opportunities were created for 4094 people, of whom 848 are permanent
and 3246 temporary. When companies operate at full scale to develop the whole land they leased,
further employment opportunities are created. Furthermore, according to the data extracted from
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the study areas, a total of 2396 households were dislocated. According to the regional and federal
government officers, the phenomenon is not considered as “dislocation” but “resettlement which is
intended to bring local communities together so as to provide better infrastructure and social services
to local communities which used to lead life along scattered hamlets and villages”. However, the
fact on the ground is that the land which was occupied for years by the dislocated communities was
leased for investors, following the state driven community resettlement programs. The temporary
employment opportunities benefited citizens, mainly for the influx of labourers from neighbouring
highlands, though some of the migrated labourers shifted to encroach on “free” forested land and
could “upgrade” themselves to the status of “investors”. Therefore, the threat to local communities is
not only from the commercial farmers who are recognized by the state but also from those labourers
employed in commercial farm lands who illegally invade “free” forest lands for their own business.
As the forest is a source of many food and non-food resources, the “free” forest lands are important
economic buffer zones for local communities, especially during periods of stress on their livelihoods.
Hence, local communities frequently see land deals as threats to their livelihoods, potentially leading
to loss of land and household income. There is a high possibility of further employment opportunities
that will be available in parallel to the farmland’s operational progress and the growth of companies in
the region. For further understanding of the leased and developed land effects on the level of local
employment generation, regression analysis was applied.
As shown in Table 10, five factors, which are, “size of land leased”, “permanent employees”,
“temporary employees”, “distance from road”, and “level of education” are entered into the equation
that altogether can explain about 73% of the variations of the dependent variable (size of cultivated
land) (adjusted R2 = 0.73). The regression model is statistically significant and indicates that, overall,
the applied model can significantly predict the dependent variable (F(5,80) = 47.38; p ď 0.01). Beta
coefficients show that increasing one unit to the standard deviation of “size of land leased“, “permanent
employees”, “temporary employees”, “distance from road” and “level of education”, will respectively
cause 0.841, 0.002, 0.016, ´0.138, and 0.038 of the increase in the standard deviation of the dependent
variable, respectively. Among the variables, the total size of land leased has a significant effect on the
size of land developed and cultivated by an investor (B = 0.25; p ď 0.01). Similarly, farm distance from
roads has a significant effect on the size of land developed or cultivated by an investor (B = ´2.13;
p ď 0.05). This implies that improving rural infrastructure (particularly roads) is indispensable in
enhancing farm level performance of commercial farms. Other factors, such as amount of labor
employed and the investor’s level of education have insignificant effects on the size of land developed
or cultivated by an investor.
Table 10. Regression analysis of the main factors influencing size of cultivated land.
Model Summary
Model R R2 Adjusted R2 Std. Error
1 0.87 0.75 0.73 120
ANOVA
Source Sum of Squares Df Mean Square F Sig.
Regression 3,437,915.40 5 687,583.08 47.38 0.0000
Residual 1,160,912.63 80 14,511.40
Total 4,598,828.03 85
Coefficients
Independent Variable B Std. Error Beta t Sig.
Size of land leased 0.25 0.02 0.841 14.81 0.000
Permanent employees 0.11 3.15 0.002 0.03 0.973
Temporary employees 0.18 0.69 0.016 0.25 0.801
Distance from road ´2.13 0.88 ´0.138 ´2.41 0.018
Level of education 2.01 3.01 0.038 0.67 0.508
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The land that has been developed by investors is a subset of the acquired land. However, they are
not always related. In fact, we have also seen different situations: sometimes, despite the increasing
size of leased lands, the investor did not have enough capital (technology, labor, and the like) to
increase the cultivated land as well. This shows that the investors sometimes are not realistic when
estimating their capabilities either. For example, an Indian company in the Benishangul-Gumuz region
was supposed to clear 50,000 ha forest within 10 years (5000 per year on average), while after five years
it had only cleared 3000 ha.
The output corresponds with the field observation that much of the temporary labour force is used
to clear the land (land preparation) and is commonly supervised by permanent employees. The more
permanent employees, the more temporary the employment is. The amount of both taken land and
developed land has not yet had a statistically significant effect on the level of temporary employment.
The most probable reason for this is that a major proportion of lands have been not developed yet,
as temporary employees are used either for weeding or cultivation jobs once investors enter into full
production. However, the amount of land developed is expected to have a meaningful effect on the
level of (temporary) employment after companies enter into full-scale production in the near future.
Friis and Reenberg (2010) [67] in their study show that local food insecurity and increasing poverty
can be considered as some of the consequences of farmland acquisition. D’Odorico and Rulli (2014) [68]
argue that even those large-scale land acquisitions carried out with the informed consent of local
communities can jeopardize the food security and livelihoods of selling communities. With regard to
the food security effects of farmland acquisition, there are key concerns among local communities and
stakeholders in the country. Local Gumuz communities are losing access to non-timber forest products
and their traditional sources of food, the natural forest areas, which they have been accustomed to
using for generations. There is a dramatic shift in terms of land use and consequently the livelihood of
local people; a shift from forest-dependent means of living to customary farming practices without
adequate support and training in farming practices. Furthermore, the socialization of the resettled
groups of households (in some cases with different ethnicity) with the recipient ones is not easy.
Therefore, it is necessary to understand the wider context and the overall predicaments of local people
in relation to the local resource access for local communities.
3.4. Environmental Aspect
As stipulated in Article 92(2) of the national constitution of Ethiopia, the implementation of
development programs and projects should not have damaging effects on the natural environment.
Furthermore, according to the country’s environmental impact assessment law (proclamation no.
299/2002), it is mandatory to properly accomplish an assessment of environmental impacts of a
development project before its implementation [69]. However, in practice, no environmental impact
assessment reports are prepared to be cross-checked in various databases and through relevant key
informants and confirmed by investors.
Environmental damage associated with large-scale land investment might directly occur as a result
of forest degradation. A study by Davis et al. (2015) [70] in Cambodia shows that nearly half of the
area where concessions were granted between 2000 and 2012 was forested in 2000. Accordingly, they
concluded that land acquisitions can act as a powerful driver of deforestation. Furthermore, as noted
by Dessalegn (2011) [66], large-scale land investment causes a huge loss in biodiversity. According
to Cotula et al. (2009) [71] and Benjaminsen et al. (2011) [72], biodiversity should be monitored as
environmental aspects of large-scale land investment. Also, the impacts on biodiversity need to
be monitored (e.g., monoculture farming, which may even lead to pest or disease problems) [73].
Additionally, as discussed by The Oakland Institute (2011) [74], the influx of huge numbers of workers
into an area raises environmental stress and results in increased deforestation, a decrease in the
fish population and wildlife, and general negative effects on ecological systems. In this regard, the
environmental cost of the villagization program in the study region has clearly contributed to additional
deforestation and degradation of forest resources. According to Rulli and D’Odorico (2013) [75], the
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acquisition of land is associated with an appropriation of land-based resources, particularly water,
which is crucial to agricultural production. Also, a study by Rulli et al. (2013) [76] shows that
land grabbing is associated with a virtual grabbing of a substantial amount of freshwater resources,
including water supplied by both rainfall and irrigation. Their study showed that the high instances
of water grabbing are of particular concern because their effects can be felt both at the local and
downstream levels, which can contribute to the possible emergence of water stress, poor water quality,
and social conflicts [76]. In line with this, there is no binding contractual agreement which can prevent
companies from implementing irrigation farming, particularly those companies which cultivate along
the banks of the Beles River, a river which contributes a significantly higher water supply to the GERD,
following the Blue Nile River. If this happens without conservation of land, it will become one of the
key issues that may cause dissatisfaction and further suspicion among other Nile Basin states which
are under the Nile Basin Initiative cooperative framework, particularly, in the lower riparian states of
Sudan and Egypt. Therefore, companies engaging in irrigation farming could cause attitudes to tense
in the Basin and extensive public concern among stakeholders.
According to Davis et al. (2015) [70], the other environmental impacts of farmland acquisition
include soil loss and compaction, elevated runoff and GHG emissions from fertilizers, and increased
competition for water resources. In addition, the acquisition of land may ultimately alter the resilience
of countries and communities to climate change.
Advancing deserts are now on the move almost everywhere [77]. It is reported that in the Sahara
Desert, 1.5 million hectares of land are becoming barren every year [78] and expanding in every
direction [77]. The forest resources of the Benishangul-Gumuz region could have been conserved as
national buffer zones against the expanding the Sahara desert into western SSA.
Parallel to land clearance for commercial farming, forest wildfire is the most prevalent challenges
observed during the field visits made in the region. The main causes for forest fire in the region include
commercial farmers who burn their wood biomass so as to clear land for tillage, local people who
practice wild honey production, and natural wildfire occurring due to the dry-hot seasons. There is
much deforestation on the ground by the investors in the Benishangul-Gumuz region but no action
has been taken to counteract it for years.
Land conversion from forests to “farm lands” has contributed to deforestation of the natural
forest resource bases of the region as well. It is very common to observe huge woody masses in every
commercial farm, and ongoing land-clearing and preparation (deforestation) (Figure 6).
Figure 6. Deforestation is part of the land preparation process by companies in the study area (Photo:
First author).
Sustainability 2016, 8, 213 20 of 27
Following deforestation, many of the commercial farms have started growing commercial crops,
such as bio-fuel trees and edible crops, resulting in huge tracts of land converted from forest to
commercial crop farms. As a result, there is a huge loss in biodiversity (both flora and fauna). Moreover,
the environmental cost of the villagization program in the study region is clearly visible and has
contributed to additional deforestation and degradation of forest resources.
The other pressing issue in the region is locally called “The Dam-in-Between”, i.e., the Grand
Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), its construction was begun in 2011. Upon completion, its
reservoir will have a capacity of 63ˆ 109 m3, covering a total area of 1800 km2 [79]. According to ERTA
(2011) [80], the dam will be the largest dam in Africa and the eighth largest hydroelectric power dam
in the world. However, the area where the dam is located is also where the government of Ethiopia
supplied huge parcels of commercial farmlands on a long-term land lease basis. The reservoir will be
threatened by sediment deposition if there is no natural buffer zone.
A similar challenge was already observed by Haregeweyn et al. (2006) [81] in the Northern part of
the country, for instance, that sediment deposition in reservoirs is a serious off-site consequence of
soil erosion. To have a natural buffer zone, land and forest areas in the closer upper watershed should
have been conserved properly, but the practice on the ground by the land deals has made these areas
the opposite of an ideal outcome. Furthermore, as argued in some studies [82,83], restoration of forest
ecosystem services will be important both for sustainable agricultural production and protection of
aquatic ecosystems.
4. Conclusions
As aforementioned, we adapted the Integrated Land Use Management and Responsible
Agricultural Investment framework to describe key land-related institutional and governance
frameworks and to examine the effectiveness of the land lease process in terms of economic, social, and
environmental expectations from agricultural outsourcing in Ethiopia. Based on the results obtained,
by the end of 2012, 2.11 million ha of the total 11.5 million ha potential investment land is already
delivered to investors out of which 600,254 ha is the share of the Western Ethiopian lowland region
called Benishangul-Gumuz followed by Oromiya and Gambella regional states with 458,292 and
399,491 ha, respectively. In the Benishangul-Gumuz region, there is large discrepancy between the
amount of land stated on an investor’s investment contractual agreement (on the document) and the
actual amount of land delivered on the ground where the latter is significantly lower than the former,
for many cases lower by 50%–60%. While there is no limit set on the amount of land that an investor
could take, investors cannot lease as much land as they want due to a maximum limit on the type of
investment land and area of investment. Land size of 5000 ha and above and which are found in a
single place are leased by the Ministry of Agriculture, and lands below 5000 ha found in different places
are leased by an appropriate regional office. There is a limit both in terms of land size and land lease
period. The base for setting the threshold by the federal government is land size while the threshold by
the regional government is made in terms of both land size and the length of the lease period. However,
the regional government’s proposition did not indicate a land lease period limit for investment land of
200 ha and less. Furthermore, some of the regulatory points are contrary to what is stated by the Federal
Government. The country is not benefitting from the actual benefits of land because the value of land
is not properly determined, which results in extremely low land lease prices for large-scale commercial
farmlands even compared to the local informal land market values. Generally, the price quoted for
different types of land is not based on its true values and the livelihoods of selling communities.
While it is imperative to encourage and attract agricultural investment in the economy of developing
countries of Africa, it is equally important to meet the desirable social, economic, and environmental
standards of the sector. Lessons learned from the Benishangul-Gumuz region highlight that supplying
huge tracts of farm lands for large-scale agricultural investment requires integrated land use planning,
appropriate land valuation, functional land governance and monitoring frameworks, and the capacity
to implement the various social and environmental laws. Land should be seen not only from the
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economic benefits of large-scale agricultural investment, but also from the angle of other marketable
services, such as payments for environmental services. According to Resosudarmo et al. (2014) [84],
sustainable land use alternatives other than commercial farming, such as reducing emissions from
deforestation and forest degradation, and fostering conservation and enhancement of forest carbon
stocks (REDD+) should be considered, especially in those ecologically fragile areas where the threat
of desertification is surging [85]. However, a study by Davis et al. (2015) [86] shows that through
these carbon credit mechanisms (e.g., reducing emissions from deforestation, forest degradation, and
REDD+), land-intensive policies may further heighten the demand for land. It has been suggested that
it is time to move beyond the approach of internalizing externalities through payments for ecosystem
services. According to Fairhead et al. (2012) [87], while understanding and critiquing the processes
that result in the neo-liberalization of nature are important, they are clearly insufficient. Alternatives
must emerge, rooted in relational, interconnected, animated understandings and experiences of
landscape, ecology, and human-ecological relations, responding to the unruly politics and ecologies
of the real world. Generally, large scale land acquisitions should not be criticized just because the
price quoted for different types of land is not based on its true values, but more in general because
it jeopardizes the livelihoods of local selling communities [68]. Countries should not ambitiously
supply large-scale farmlands without adequate preparation, land use planning, proper land valuation,
and capable monitoring framework. Based on the results, there is no single statement in any of
the contractual documents or templates which requests the participation of any other stakeholders
(e.g., local communities) when signing the land lease contracts. Moreover, the compensations are not
mentioned in the contracts either. Adequate consultations should have been primarily made with local
communities, aiming for their active participation when formulating the contract and all agreements.
Accordingly, commercial land acquisitions should pass through “inclusive” deals that integrate the
biophysical environment, stakeholders, governance, and institutions [35]. Following the acquisition of
land by transnational companies, there is a dramatic shift in terms of land use and the livelihoods of
local people: a shift from forest-dependent means of living to customary farming practices without
adequate support and training in farming practices.
Environmental damage associated with large-scale land investment in Ethiopia happens directly
as a result of forest degradation and land conversion which cause biodiversity loss and soil erosion [66].
Integration and harmonization of large-scale commercial farming with other local development projects
is crucially important for countries which supply tracts of large-scale farm lands to investors. For
instance, there is a large concern in the region, where the supply of large-scale commercial farmlands
around the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) and long-term land use contracts are made
between the government of Ethiopia and commercial companies [88]. Accordingly, future studies
should address the long-term effect upon the functionality and sustainability of the reservoir of the dam
caused by those large-scale mechanized commercial farms which are operating in the upper watersheds
of the region. Introducing cadastral systems and fit-for-purpose land management approaches can
contribute to resolving the prevailing challenges and predicaments of large-scale private commercial
farming in the region [28,29]. Large-scale agricultural investment in the Benishangul-Gumuz region in
general, and the Dangure-Guba districts in particular, is at the cross point of protecting the reservoir
of the hydroelectric dam or continuing the supply of large-scale farm lands, which has resulted in
significant deforestation and land conversion. Additionally, the forest resources of the region could
have been conserved as national buffer zones for the expanding Sahara Desert, as the critical functions
of forestlands in deterring the expansion of the Sahara desert to western SSA are indispensable. More
lessons can be learned from commercial farmland acquisition in Ethiopia for future studies on issues
such as identifying factors that influence the size of cultivated land, e.g., type of crops and type of
investment land, the determining factors of employment among commercial farmlands in commercial
land supplying developing countries in general, and in the study area in particular, household level
welfare effects, land use land cover changes, and the nexus between large-scale commercial farming
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and the mega hydro dam and its reservoir. Lastly, improving rural infrastructure, particularly road, is
essential to boost the farm level performance of commercial farms.
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Appendix
Table A1. The evolution of land use-land governance institutional frameworks in Ethiopia.
Proclamation(Regulation) Basic Content Related to Land
1955: Revised Constitution of
Ethiopia (article 130)
All natural resources of the country (water, forest, land, etc.) became state domain.
Land was part of the sacred trust and meant for the “benefit of both the present and
succeeding generations of people” in Ethiopia [47]. However the imperial system was
characterized with feudal lords who possessed land and the majority of citizens were
tenants. Until the end of the imperial government in 1974, the land tenure system of
the country was complex and intricate, it varied from region to region following the
occurrence of different socio-political events in the country. Generally, the tenure
system could be classified as private tenures and usufructuary tenures. Usufructuary
tenure system is mainly based on the type of institutions which hold the eventual
reversionary right over the land and could be classified as rist, semon, and maderia, or
yemengist. Later in 1974, ownership for land became one of the major causes for the
socialist-driven revolution in the country which overthrew the imperial/feudal
system in the country. “Land to the tiller” was one of the mottos of the revolution.
1975–1982: Public Ownership of
Rural Lands proclamation,
proclamation no. 31/1975; Peasant
Association Organization and
Consolidation Proclamation
no. 71/1975; amended by Peasant
Associations Consolidation
Proclamation no. 223/1982
Abolished (without compensation) all forms of private ownership, and all land used
for agriculture or grazing purposes throughout the country was declared to become
the collective property of the Ethiopian people. The law stipulated that no
compensation would be paid for rural land or tree crops or any forest on such
land [48]. In the same year, the proclamation was strengthened by the establishment
of peasant associations to ensure equitable distribution of land and to expand the
base of socialist relations that would work for the build-up of democracy in the
country [48]. Later in 1982, local peasant associations (i.e, kebelle peasant associations)
were given the powers and duties to distribute land within their territorial
delimitations [48].
1995: The constitution of Ethiopia,
proclamation no. 1/1995,
article 40.2; article 50.2
The 1995 constitution of Ethiopia is the existing supreme law of the country, its land,
and all other natural resources. Land is commonly owned by the Nations,
Nationalities, and Peoples of Ethiopia and it is not subject to sale or to other means of
exchange. Regional states are given the power and mandate to administer land and
other natural resources in accordance with federal laws. Peasants and pastoralists
have usufruct right over land without any charge and without time limit, including
the safeguard against expulsion from “their” land except if it is intended for public
purposes, which is subject to compensation commensurate with the value of the
property on the land [37].
1997: Rural Land Administration
Proclamation no. 89/1997, Later
repealed by proclamation
no. 456/2005.
Stated general guidelines and set broader principles about the contents of land
administration law to be enacted by each regional council, such as ensuring free
assignment of landholding rights to peasants and nomads without any
discrimination of sexes but with transparency, fairness, and participation [37,49].
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Table A1. Cont.
Proclamation(Regulation) Basic Content Related to Land
2002: Investment proclamation.
280/2002. Later repealed by
investment proclamation
no. 769/2012
So as to widen the participation of foreign investors in addition to the domestic ones.
Stated four forms of investment and set minimum capital requirements for foreign
investors (100,000 USD for single investment; 60,000 USD jointly with domestic
investors), allocation of land, and further rights and privileges for different forms and
types of investors [69].
2004: Reorganization of
government organs of Ethiopia,
proclamation no. 380/2004
Restructured the powers and duties of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural
Development mandated with the power to draft land use policy, land administration
guidelines, conservation and use of forest and related resources such as wildlife [48].
2005: Expropriation of
landholdings for public purposes
and payment of compensation
Proclamation no. 455/2005
Defined the key principles that should be considered to determine compensation for a
person whose landholding has been expropriated for various development purposes.
It also stated the state bodies that have the mandate to determine the responsibility to
pay the compensation for land. Generally, it is part of the constitutional requirements
of the constitution of the country, article 51/(5) and article 40/(8) to enact laws
concerning the utilization of land. A district (woreda) or urban administrations are
given mandate to expropriate rural or urban landholdings for public objectives [40].
2005: Federal Rural Land
Administration and Land Use
Proclamation no. 456/2005
(which repealed the Federal Land
Administration Proclamation,
89/1997)
Targeted to increase the land tenure security, enhance farm land productivity, and
circumvent expectation of land redistribution among citizens. Farmers hold a
perpetual use right on their farm holdings, and this use right should be strengthened
through the issuance of land holding-land use certificates and registration, followed
by cadastre. A federal framework for rural land administration and land use
proclamation, each regional state is mandated to arrange its own legal framework to
register land in a region [40]. Security of land tenure versus agricultural investment
has been a point argument which requires further investigation. Although the
relationship between tenure security of land and agricultural investment varies,
tenure security has a significant effect upon farmers’ investment in certain counties in
Ethiopia [89].
2007: Payment for compensation
for property situated on
landholding expropriated for
public purposes, Council of
Ministers regulation no. 135/2007
The amount of compensation for a property situated on a land to be expropriated
should be determined on the basis of current market prices. Provisions are set
concerning compensation for a building, fences, non-crops, perennial crops, trees,
protected grass, permanent improvement on rural land, relocated property, a mining
license, and burial ground. Furthermore, formulas for calculating the amount of
compensation for the stated properties are set [49].
2009: Benishangul-Gumuz Region
Rural Investment Land Use
Regulation, Regional Council’s
Regulation no. 29/2009
Explains investment land supply procedures, investment landholding, lease system
and duration of land use, forest protection, land evaluation, land use contract, land
lease price in the different districts (woredas) of the region, rights and obligations of
investors, etc. [57].
2010: Definition of power and
duties of executive organs,
proclamation no. 691/2010
The proclamation established twenty ministries one of which was Ministry of
Agriculture. The Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MoARD) is
dissolved and replaced with Ministry of Agriculture (MoA). Powers and duties
which had formerly given to the MARD were transferred to the MoA. The MoA is
mandated to ensure conservation of biodiversity, and “the administration of
agricultural investment lands entrusted to the federal government on the basis of
powers of delegation obtained from regional states” [90].
2010: Agricultural Transformation
Council and Agency Establishment,
Council of Ministers regulation
no. 198/2010
Lead the identification, design, and effective implementation of solutions to the
challenges of agricultural development, for instance, identification of soil fertility
problems and solutions for the same [71].
2012: Investment proclamation no.
769/2012, it repealed investment
proclamation no. 280/2002
Stated provisions which could enhance investment not only in the agriculture but
also in the manufacturing sector and improve some laws stated in the previous
investment proclamation. Areas of investment for domestic investors, foreign
investors, and investments to undertaken jointly are delineated. Amendment on
minimum capital requirements for foreign investors are set [64].
2012: Investment Incentives and
Investment Areas Reserved for
Domestic Investors, Council of
Ministers regulation, regulation
no. 270/2012
Specified various types of incentives for investors depending on different criteria
such as type of investment, location of investment, performance of investment or
progress. Exceptions for income tax and exemptions from custom duty for two–nine
years. Specifically, investors who invest in Afar, Benishangul-Gumuz, Gambela, and
Somale Regions are entitled to 30% income tax reduction. Similar income tax
reduction will be made if companies invest in theGuji and Borena zones of Oromia
Region and in many of the areas in South-Omo, Segen, Bench-Maji, Sheka, Dawro,
Kefa Zones, and some Woredas of the State of Southern Nations and Nationalities
People [64].
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